pixel-chain-story

Audit package — Gate I (preparing)

Status: PREPARING — scoped self-review package ready; external audit not yet commissioned.
Do not claim: “Audited,” “production crypto,” or “trusted L1.”

Frozen with: THREAT-MODEL.md v1.1 · evidence dates via CI scripts below.

Scope (in)

Surface	Path	Why
Hash-OTS + leaf single-use	src/lib/pixel/crypto.ts, chain.ts (usedOtsLeaves)	Spend / PoLS forgery if broken
ML-DSA-65 scheme surface	src/lib/pixel/scheme.ts (signPixel / verifyPixel)	Default wallet / node birth
Frozen quantum vectors	src/lib/pixel/vectors/quantum-v1.json	Drift / regression
Tip accept path	acceptBlock in src/lib/pixel/chain.ts (docs historically said acceptPixel)	Peer can poison tip
ULA EVM twin	contracts/ULAVerifier.sol, src/lib/pixel/ula-evm.ts	Foreign receipt forgery
ULA ML-DSA off-chain + gate	src/lib/pixel/ula-mldsa.ts, contracts/ULAOffchainMldsaGate.sol	PQ birth ↔ foreign receipt story
Bridge custody inversion	bridge-custody.ts	Foreign verify ≠ vault release

Scope (out — for this package)

• Full BFT / ≥7 operator live set (Gate G)
• Public testnet bridge links (Gate E remainder)
• Gossip/RPC default plaintext (ML-KEM is lab-optional; see transport-kem.ts)
• Continuity merchant UX / DNS automation
• ZK / full on-chain Dilithium verify (gas-impractical; see ULA-MLDSA.md)

Evidence commands (must stay green)

bun run test:crypto
bun run test:ots-reuse
bun run test:mldsa
bun run test:vectors
bun run test:ula
bun run test:ula-mldsa
bun run test:bridge-custody
bun run test:light
bun run test:audit-scope
bun run test:forge   # needs foundry

Self-review checklist (lab)

• Threat model frozen (v1.1) with quantum + eclipse notes updated
• Default scheme is ML-DSA-65; OTS retained + ledger single-use
• ULAVerifier.IS_STUB == false (keccak-OTS twin)
• ML-DSA native ULA verify path + honest off-chain gate contract
• Weak verifyLight remains fail-closed
• External firm engaged — open
• Criticals from external report fixed — open
• Report link published here — open

Claim unlock (only after external report + fixes)

“Audited components (scoped).” Until then the honest line is:

Scoped audit package prepared; external review pending.

Engagement notes (for a future auditor)

1. Prefer review of @noble/post-quantum integration (domain separation, key persistence, OTS cursor) over re-auditing NIST algorithms from scratch.
2. acceptBlock + OTS reuse set + electable-bound PoLS are consensus-critical.
3. ULA: distinguish keccak-OTS on-chain twin from ML-DSA off-chain + commit gate — do not conflate.
4. Transport ML-KEM is out of ledger safety scope unless gossip encryption is enabled in production.